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SUMMARY 
The federal government’s decision to impose a minimum national price on 
carbon emissions has the potential to make certain businesses in the country 
less competitive. Specifically, there are emissions-intensive and trade-exposed 
industries across Canada that compete against producers from other jurisdictions 
where governments do not put a price on carbon. For these industries, the 
obligation to pay a carbon price creates a competitive disadvantage. Specifically, 
these businesses will face higher costs and may encounter a loss of market share 
to international competitors from jurisdictions that lack the same emission-control 
measures. That not only hurts Canadian businesses, it could also negate any 
emissions reductions that carbon pricing in Canada achieves on a global scale. 
The federal government has opted to protect such emissions-intensive, trade-
exposed businesses using subsidies called output-based allocations (OBAs). This 
is the same system that Alberta is introducing through its forthcoming Carbon 
Competiveness Regulation. It also shares certain similarities with cap-and-trade 
programs, such as those in Ontario and Quebec, which provide free allocations 
of emissions permits to certain firms. 
OBAs are a desirable complementary policy to a carbon price as they maintain 
the incentive for producers to invest in production methods and facilities that 
are less emissions intensive. So while producers are still, nevertheless, subsidized 
to offset the tax burden of the carbon price, they will, under an OBA system, see 
greater benefits the more they work to reduce their emissions intensity. Still, 
to function most effectively and most efficiently, an OBA policy should follow 
certain key principles. 
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The most critical principle in the design of an OBA policy is ensuring that OBAs are 
allocated to facilities independent of their individual emission levels, and allocated equally 
(on a per unit basis) to facilities producing the same product. One of the major flaws with 
Alberta’s current Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER) is that it does not follow 
this principle. Rather, subsidies under SGER are allocated based on a facility’s historical 
emissions intensity. As a result, more generous subsidies are given to those facilities that 
are “dirtier” (that is, those with higher emissions intensities) than to “cleaner” facilities 
with lower emission intensities. 
Secondly, it is important for a well-designed OBA policy to have transparent costs. 
Including a clear accounting of OBAs in government finance reports will ensure the 
public is fully aware of the revenues being directed to the subsidies. 
Thirdly, OBAs for different facilities are best allocated using a classification system based 
on the product being produced, and not using more conventional industry-classification 
codes. Commonly used conventional industry classifications—for example, conventional 
oil and natural gas extraction—group together facilities that produce distinct products 
and compete in different markets. Consequently, this classification will not recognize the 
various levels of emissions intensity and trade exposure within an industry. This will result 
in some facilities receiving more OBAs than they should and others receiving less than 
they should.
Finally, a well-designed OBA system should seek to be as administratively efficient as 
possible with minimal implementation costs imposed on government and businesses.
It is important to recognize that the federal carbon price and OBAs are a new policy and 
that many large emitting facilities have been making investment decisions based on a 
previous regulatory environment. Therefore, a compromise approach may be to initially 
provide an output subsidy based on a facility’s past emissions intensity (as Alberta has 
historically done under its SGER system) and then to transition gradually to the optimal 
OBA system over time.
1INTRODUCTION
Canada is taking a leadership role in the world by implementing efficient environmental 
policies, such as carbon pricing. The federal government first announced in October 2016 
its intention to implement a pan-Canadian carbon price (Environment and Climate Change 
Canada, 2016b). Starting in 2018, all provinces will be required to have a minimum carbon 
price of $10 per tonne. This minimum price will increase by $10 per year, reaching $50 
per tonne in 2022. Provinces were given the option of designing their own system — in 
the form of either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program — to implement the price. For 
provinces opting not to go this route, the federal government will implement the carbon 
price through a federally designed system.
A technical paper released by Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) in May 
2017 provided initial details on the federally designed system. The proposed system will 
have two components: (1) a carbon tax on fossil fuel consumption (equal to the minimum 
prescribed level in each year); and (2) output subsidies (output-based allocations or OBAs) 
for large industrial facilities plus an opt-in option for smaller facilities.
Although not explicitly acknowledged in ECCC’s technical paper, the proposed federal 
system strongly resembles Alberta’s carbon-pricing system. Alberta’s system was 
announced in November 2015, and was based on the recommendations provided by its 
climate change advisory panel. The panel, chaired by Andrew Leach of the University 
of Alberta, recommended in its Climate Leadership Report (hereafter referred to as the 
Leach report) that: “ … the Government of Alberta broaden and improve its existing 
carbon pricing regime, and complement carbon pricing with additional policies to reduce 
the emissions intensity of our electricity supply and our oil and gas production, to promote 
energy efficiency, and to add value to our resources through investments in technological 
innovation” (Leach et al., 2015, 4).
The report also noted the concern that, in addition to their environmental benefits, these 
policies represent a cost to Alberta’s economy. As a result, in the absence of matching 
policy from other jurisdictions, these policies can impede Alberta’s competitiveness. This 
concern motivated the recommendation of output subsidies (also referred to as output-based 
allocations, or OBAs) to mitigate the effects of carbon pricing on trade-exposed industries.
OBAs, as a complement to emissions pricing via a carbon tax, have been recognized as 
an attractive and likely effective mechanism through which competitiveness interests can 
be balanced against the preservation of a strong incentive to reduce emissions intensities 
(Fischer and Fox, 2007). When compared to alternative approaches, such as corporate 
income tax reductions, OBAs are likely to better address competitiveness concerns within 
and between sectors. In particular, a conventional tax-credit system used to address 
competitiveness concerns would have limited or no benefit to firms with zero or negative 
tax liability, since these firms wouldn’t be able to use these credits (Gray and Metcalf, 
2017). There is a growing understanding of OBAs in general, thanks in part to accessible 
descriptions by the Ecofiscal Commission (Dion, 2017). We add to this, and go deeper into 
general principles that should guide OBA design.
While the Leach report offered in broad strokes what the OBAs should achieve and how 
they should be implemented in Alberta, it does not give much policy guidance in terms of 
designing the actual policy. The details of Alberta’s OBAs will be outlined in a new Carbon 
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technical paper provided only a broad overview of the federal government’s proposed 
OBAs. Feedback is being gathered through to the end of June 2017 and will presumably 
inform the development of a more detailed policy that will be released at a later date.
The purpose of this paper is to describe principles of policy design that can help make the 
implementation of OBAs efficient, fair and effective. It is additionally worth noting that, 
because an OBA system provides emissions credits to firms, it shares significant similarities 
with a cap-and-trade system that provides free allocations of emissions permits. As such, 
the principles discussed in this paper apply not only to Alberta and the federal government, 
but also to those provinces that are implementing their carbon price through a cap-and-
trade system.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We start with a backgrounder that 
introduces the economics of OBAs and discusses why they are a desirable complementary 
policy to a carbon price. We then introduce and describe four primary principles for the 
design of an OBA system. Using Alberta as an example, we next offer recommendations for 
transitioning from current policies to an optimal OBA system. Lastly we offer some brief 
concluding remarks.
BACKGROUND: POLICY AND ECONOMICS BEHIND OUTPUT SUBSIDIES
Let’s begin with a brief, high-level overview of carbon pricing in Canada and of approaches 
to address competitiveness concerns. 
Economists broadly find evidence that the most cost-effective approach to lowering 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) is to price them. The logic is simple: each tonne of 
emissions has environmental consequences,1 but individuals and businesses tend to neglect 
these consequences in their decisions. Economists call this an externality, and the result is 
too much emissions production. In the presence of an appropriately set carbon price, those 
consequences are no longer hidden and the full cost of individual decisions are seen. Some 
decisions will no longer make sense, and behaviour will change, thus lowering emissions.2
Though many discussions about carbon pricing focus on the effect it has on the fuel we 
buy to power our cars or to heat our homes, an important source of emissions are large 
industrial emitters, defined as those that emit more than 50,000 tonnes of GHGs per year. 
In 2015, for example, there were 563 such facilities in Canada and the largest 100 of them 
emitted nearly 200 million tonnes of carbon-dioxide equivalent (CO
2
e) — or almost 30 per 
cent of Canada’s total emissions.3 
1 
For a discussion of the latest evidence, see NASA (2017).
2 
To be sure, this argument requires that we know where the appropriate carbon-price level is. There is uncertainty here, 
just as there is uncertainty about the socially optimal path of future global emissions levels. For details around how 
Environment and Climate Change Canada, among others, summarizes the magnitude of the environmental externality from 
GHG emissions, see its Social Cost of Carbon estimates in Environment and Climate Change Canada (2016a). 
3 
A list of large-emitting facilities is available online from Environment and Climate Change Canada at http://www.ec.gc.ca/
ges-ghg/default.asp?lang=En&n=8044859A-1. 
3And not all provinces are the same. The majority of Alberta and New Brunswick emissions, 
for example, are accounted for by facilities emitting more than 50,000 tonnes of GHGs per 
year. Alberta and Saskatchewan, both of whom have many coal-fired power plants and oil 
and gas facilities, together account for nearly two-thirds of Canada’s total large-emitter 
emissions. We plot all provinces in Figure 1. Given Canada’s somewhat decentralized 
approach to climate change policy, this provincial variation is important. 
FIGURE 1 LARGE EMITTERS AS SHARE OF TOTAL PROVINCIAL GHGs (2015)
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Source: Canada’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting Program (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017a),  
and Canada’s 2017 National Inventory Report (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017b).
There are also large differences across sectors. In Figure 2, we show 2015 emissions by 
Canada’s 10 largest sectors. The dominance of fossil fuel power generation and non-
conventional oil extraction (such as Alberta’s oil sands) is evident. 
4FIGURE 2 LARGE EMITTER EMISSIONS IN CANADA BY SECTOR (2015)
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Source: Canada’s Facility Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting Program (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017a).
Given the importance of large emitters for certain sectors and for certain provinces, carbon 
pricing here requires careful consideration. In principle, pricing emissions from large 
industrial sources is as straightforward as it is for the fuel everyday households and smaller 
businesses buy. But for a variety of reasons we discuss later, policy-makers may opt to treat 
large emitters differently than other emission sources. In particular, they may provide firms 
with free emissions allowances. 
In the case of cap-and-trade systems, the allowances take the form of free permits that 
governments distribute. Less widely known is that through the use of OBAs, carbon-tax 
systems can feature something equivalent to free permit allocations. To make this clear,  
we discuss key features of Alberta’s pre-existing Specified Gas Emitters Regulation 
(SGER) system.
Alberta’s SGER System
Through its Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER), initially implemented in 2007, 
Alberta was the first jurisdiction in North America to implement a carbon price (McCrank 
and Ross, 2015). The SGER applies to large industrial emitters, and if a facility is subject to 
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to lower emissions. Roughly speaking, each facility is given a “baseline” emissions 
intensity as well as a target for bringing its actual emissions intensity sufficiently below its 
baseline level. Facilities can choose whether to lower emissions to the target threshold or, 
alternatively, pay a charge for each tonne in excess of the threshold. When the program was 
first introduced in 2007, facilities were given targets of 12-per-cent below their baseline 
level and the price per tonne above the threshold was $15. In 2017, the target is 20-per-cent 
below a facility’s baseline level and the price per tonne is $30. 
To illustrate the basic principle, consider the Sundance coal power plant. In 2015, this 
facility emitted about 14.4 million tonnes of GHGs and produced nearly 13 TWh of 
electricity, giving it an emissions intensity of about 1.1 tonnes per MWh of electricity 
produced.4 If Sundance continues to produce electricity at its baseline emissions intensity 
and a price of $30 per tonne were charged on all emissions, that would cost well over $400 
million per year — equivalent to about three cents per kWh of electricity. But 80 per cent of 
its baseline emissions are provided to it for free, so the charge is only on the excess 20 per 
cent — lowering the cost substantially, to barely over half a cent per kWh. Essentially, 80 
per cent of the baseline emissions are “allocated” to the facility for free. 
It is interesting, but not immediately obvious, that the SGER system is equivalent to 
a facility being charged $30 per tonne on its total emissions but then simultaneously 
receiving a subsidy to offset most of the resulting costs. Each tonne a firm is permitted to 
emit for free is a tonne for which it need not pay the carbon tax. One would be willing to 
pay up to, but not exceeding the carbon tax to buy such a permit. Thus, in our example of 
the Sundance power plant, it is implicitly being charged $30 for each tonne it emits and 
simultaneously receiving $25.50 per MWh produced as a subsidy.5 
The subsidies implicit in a system such as SGER need not represent actual cash flows from 
government to firms. That such permits are often provided for free by the government, 
rather than recorded as an explicit subsidy, is merely a choice of accounting rules and not 
a reflection of the underlying economics involved. Also, different firms will (under SGER) 
receive different subsidies per units of output. 
The Economics of OBAs
Will such subsidies undermine the incentive effect of pricing carbon? Yes and no, but 
mostly no. To understand why, it’s instructive to know some of the basic economics at work.
Firms produce output by using inputs. But there are countless ways in which different 
inputs may be combined with different methods and technologies to produce output. 
Critical for us: how to produce and how much to produce are, in a very important sense, 
separate decisions. Firms decide how to produce based on the relative prices of those 
various inputs or production technologies available. They then decide how much to produce 
to earn the largest profits, which itself depends on the scale of demand for their product, 
their costs of production, and the price they can therefore charge.
4 
Emissions data for TransAlta’s Sundance Thermal Electric Power Generating Plant from ECCC’s Facility Reporting Data 
(Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017a), and power generation data from Leach and Tombe (2016).
5 
From 1.1 t/MWh multiplied by the 80-per-cent allowance multiplied by the $30-per-tonne carbon tax.
6In terms of environmental impacts, some alternative production methods will be dirtier 
than others. Putting a price on emissions will therefore give important incentives to firms 
to consider cleaner methods, different technologies, and so on. This will tend to lower the 
emissions intensity of their output — that is, the emissions per unit of production. But, it 
will also tend to increase their costs, necessitating they charge a higher price to consumers 
and this will shrink demand for their product. Thus, their total production — their scale — 
will also decline. To the extent that policy-makers wish to avoid this, a subsidy to output 
will dampen the cost increase faced by firms, so its price need not rise as much and the 
resulting scale of production will not fall as much. 
Critically, this subsidy — which an OBA implicitly is — does not affect a firm’s emissions 
intensity (Fischer and Fox, 2007; Adkins et al., 2012; Gray and Metcalf, 2017). That is, a 
subsidy on a firm’s output will have no effect on whatever production mix a firm opts to 
use when producing that output. We illustrate the overall effect of GHG prices, an output 
subsidy, and both combined (an OBA system) in Table 1.
TABLE 1 STYLIZED REPRESENTATION OF HOW EMISSIONS AND OUTPUT RESPOND TO POLICY
GHG Intensity Total Output Total GHGs
Price on GHGs   
Output Subsidy No Effect  
Both Combined — An OBA System  * *
*  In practice, output subsidies in an OBA system are not likely to be so generous as to increase output above its pre-
policy level. Thus, we note the overall effect of an OBA system is to shrink output. But, strictly speaking, the effect is 
ambiguous without explicit restrictions on the magnitude of the subsidy. 
In short, putting a price on emissions gives incentives for firms to lower emissions, 
regardless of how much they produce. Providing a subsidy to output will tend to increase 
a firm’s output more than otherwise. To be clear, this increases emissions — since each 
unit produced has associated emissions — but does not increase emissions intensity. The 
incentive to lower emissions, per unit of output, remains. In practice, output subsidies in an 
OBA system are not likely to be so generous as to increase output above its pre-policy level. 
Thus, we note the overall effect of an OBA system is to shrink output. But, the amount by 
which output shrinks is smaller than would be the case if only emissions were priced and 
no subsidies offered, perhaps substantially so. 
With this background in policy and economics in hand, we turn to discussing the 
motivations behind OBAs and then move to principles for designing an efficient and 
effective system.
Why Subsidize Output? And for Which Sectors?
In an ideal world (what economists call “first best”), all countries would be meeting their 
climate change commitments with some form of uniform carbon pricing. This could be 
through a carbon tax, or a cap-and-trade system. In either scenario, firms face carbon 
pricing regardless of where they are located and where they sell to. This creates uniformity 
in the treatment of firms and, while their costs increase, a firm operating in Alberta is not 
adversely affected relative to a firm operating elsewhere, such as the United States.
7However, this ideal situation is not the current state of the world. Relatively few countries 
have carbon pricing in place. Of significance for Canada is that in most of the U.S. — our 
most important trading partner — there is no carbon pricing. This means that firms here, as 
a result of Canadian carbon pricing, have their costs increase relative to their competitors 
in other jurisdictions. This has detrimental impacts on the Canadian economy and can also 
cause economic activity to leave for other jurisdictions with lower environmental standards, 
resulting in lower economic activity in Canada and no global reduction in emissions.
To illustrate the problem more concretely, consider where OBAs are particularly useful. 
In Alberta, the largest sector where carbon pricing may be of particular concern is oil and 
gas extraction. Together, large emitters within these sectors accounted for over 112 million 
tonnes of GHG emissions in 2014 (over 40 per cent of the province’s total).6 Carbon pricing 
will have substantial effects on production costs. For non-conventional oil, based on the 
average intensity of oil sands in-situ production, a $30-per-tonne carbon price adds $2 
per barrel to costs. As the overwhelming majority of oil production is exported, and as oil 
prices are determined largely on a world market, producers will have little ability to pass 
these added costs onto consumers and their competitiveness may be challenged.
Oil and gas production provides a useful illustration, but it is by no means the only 
sector where carbon pricing may present competitiveness concerns. Any firm that faces 
competition from outside of Canada (in particular, competition from a firm located in a 
jurisdiction with a lower, or no carbon price) will face a competitive disadvantage resulting 
from a pan-Canadian carbon price (all other things being equal). This disadvantage is larger 
in sectors with high emissions intensity since these produce more GHG emissions (and 
therefore face a higher carbon-tax burden) per dollar of output. As such, the combination 
of emissions intensity and the share of production that is exported are of paramount 
concern in determining the sectors in which a carbon price will have the most significant 
negative impacts on competitiveness. These sectors of concern are referred to as “emissions 
intensive, trade exposed” or EITE, and they deserve particular attention when formulating 
the specifics of a formal OBA system.
Once again turning to Alberta as an example, Figure 3 indicates the overall emissions 
intensity for the six highest-intensity sectors in the Alberta economy.7 Emissions intensity 
here is defined as the emissions generated per $1,000 of gross output from the sector, and 
is split into direct intensities (emissions produced by the sector) and indirect intensities 
(emissions produced by upstream sectors supplying inputs into the indicated sector). 
6 
Data: ECCC’s Facility Reporting Data (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017a). The 2014 emissions by large 
emitters in that dataset were: 56.6 MT for non-conventional oil extraction emissions, 48.8 MT for fossil-fuel electric power 
generation, and 7.6 MT for conventional oil extraction. In 2014, total Alberta emissions were 274 MT. 
7 
Sector definitions are based on the two-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) definitions used by 
Statistics Canada in the S-Level provincial input-output tables produced as a component of the System of National Accounts 
(SNA) codes. They are modified somewhat here in that Natural Gas and Crude Oil Extraction have been disaggregated from 
the single “Mining, Quarrying and Oil and Gas Extraction sector” along with other mining and related support activities.
8FIGURE 3 DIRECT AND INDIRECT EMISSIONS INTENSITIES FOR TOP SIX ALBERTA SECTORS (2011)
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As indicated under the EITE definition, the emissions intensities only tell part of the story 
since trade exposure is also a critical consideration for competitiveness. In Figure 4, we 
plot a measure of the trade exposure of Alberta sectors against the emissions-intensity data. 
We use a simple measure (exports as a percentage of gross production) to indicate the trade 
exposure of each sector. Additionally in Figure 4 we have converted the intensity measures 
given in Figure 3 into an equivalent tax rate based on the carbon tax paid per dollar of net 
income (assuming a carbon tax of $30/tonne of CO
2
e).8, 9
8 
This is essentially a rough measure of the extent to which a carbon tax would affect the bottom line of an average firm in 
each of these sectors, absent any price or behavioural changes.
9 
In addition to the figures provided here, Canada’s Ecofiscal Commission has undertaken a more detailed analysis of 
Canada’s emissions-intensive and trade-exposed sectors (Beale et al., 2017). Their approach is to (1) measure a sector’s 
trade exposure as imports plus exports relative to its GDP contribution, and (2) measure a sector’s emissions intensity as the 
effect of pricing carbon on a sector’s total cost. If trade exposure is 15 per cent or more, and if the effect of carbon pricing 
is to increase costs by five per cent or more, Beale et al. deem a sector to be emissions intensive and trade exposed. By this 
methodology, roughly 18 per cent of Alberta’s economy falls into this category.
9FIGURE 4 ALBERTA’S EMISSIONS-INTENSIVE, TRADE-EXPOSED SECTORS (2011)
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Output subsidies are meant to cushion the effect of pricing carbon on those sectors towards 
the right and the top of the above graph. It should also be noted that the vertical placement 
of some of the bubbles on Figure 4 are highly sensitive to world movements in commodity 
prices. In particular, the data depicted in Figure 4 are from 2011, when the market price 
for crude oil generally averaged twice the current (post-2014) market average. If we were 
to perform the same calculation using the 2017 price, we would likely find an effective 
direct carbon tax in the crude oil extraction sector that is nearly double that indicated in the 
figure.10
The utilities sector is not pictured in Figure 4. If it were, it would be at the extreme left 
(very low exports as a proportion of gross production) but above the end of the y-axis (a 
33-per-cent effective direct carbon-tax rate). While the utilities sector does not fit well 
within the EITE definition, it is still an important concern since we should not neglect 
input-output linkages across firms and sectors. Electricity is not itself typically exported 
from Alberta, so there are fewer competitiveness concerns there, but other sectors that 
do export (such as various manufacturing activities) can intensively use electricity. 
Higher electricity prices will increase costs in those export-oriented sectors, and their 
competitiveness may suffer.
10 
Since the data required to do this calculation for 2017 is not yet available, we made the same calculation using 2009 data 
as a close proxy. (In 2009, the average benchmark crude oil price was around US$60 per barrel, which is more in line with 
current pricing than the greater-than-US$100 per-barrel average from 2011.) Using 2009 data, the effective direct carbon tax 
would be approximately seven per cent versus the four per cent indicated for 2011.
10
This concept is illustrated in Figure 3 which indicates the split of direct emissions (those 
produced in the sector indicated) and indirect emissions (those produced by upstream 
sectors selling inputs to the sector indicated). The figure shows that indirect emissions are a 
concern to most sectors and that, in particular, the manufacturing sector faces a particularly 
high burden (in the form of increased input costs) from indirect emissions relative to direct 
emissions. Effective OBA design should take into account upstream linkages as well as the 
EITE characteristics of each sector. 
The above also speaks to a concept known as “leakage.” If Canada introduces stringent 
environmental policies, emissions-intensive operations here may move elsewhere. A good 
example may be iron and steel production. It is both a tradable commodity with an energy- 
and emissions-intensive production process. If such production facilities were to expand 
elsewhere and contract in Canada as a result of stringent environmental policy here, Canada 
would bear economic costs for little global environmental gain. Indeed, if steel production 
elsewhere is even dirtier than here, global emissions could in principle rise. By providing 
subsidies to such sectors, such leakage can be mitigated. 
This is an ongoing area of research, and recent work indeed suggests that as Canada’s 
trading partners introduce more stringent policies, the optimal OBA rate is lower as the 
leakage concern declines (Bohringer et al., 2017). To complicate matters, though, it depends 
on the type of policies Canada’s trading partners introduce. Europe, for example, has a cap-
and-trade system and its aggregate emissions are therefore fixed. There is little concern of 
leakage from Canada to Europe, since any pressure for that to occur will automatically lead 
to higher emission-permit prices in Europe (and thus more stringent policy there).11 Thus, 
trade exposure itself is not sufficient to claim leakage is an important concern. Careful 
analysis and examination is required.
Moving beyond trade and competitiveness concerns, there are a number of other 
considerations that should influence the design and targeting of output subsidies. 
First is the issue of investment returns. Even if a sector does not export a carbon-intensive 
product, pricing carbon may result in lower investment returns. The resulting reduction in 
capital spending has implications for a province’s overall GDP, for jobs, wages, and so on. 
Second, there may be fairness considerations. To the extent that past investment decisions 
were made with an implicit understanding of the nature of a province’s policy environment, 
changing policy can lead to windfall losses that we may wish to avoid. OBAs can serve as 
a buffer to the bottom line of such firms without undermining the incentive effect of carbon 
pricing (if, that is, the OBA system is well designed). Another element of fairness is the 
aspect of treatment of large and small firms. Often, the initial structure of OBA systems 
is framed around large emitters (with good reason). However, because OBAs represent an 
effective subsidy or benefit, smaller firms that are not afforded allocations under an OBA 
system may be presented with a perverse incentive to increase emissions in order to obtain 
OBA benefits afforded to larger firms. Given this, it is important to allow smaller firms to 
11 
For more discussion of this point, see Goulder and Schein (2013).
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opt in to the OBA system at their own discretion. With that said, once a small firm has chosen 
to opt in, the same design principles discussed should apply to all firms receiving OBAs.12
Finally, there is also the issue of impacts on households. As the end-use demanders of goods 
and services, households pay the majority of the costs of a carbon price. The carbon price 
increases the price of goods and services proportional to their emissions intensity. While 
provincial governments can implement rebates for lower-income residents to cushion that 
group against these price increases, as is the case with carbon tax regimes in Alberta and 
British Columbia, output subsidies can also be used to reduce the price impact on certain 
goods and services. In Alberta, for example, electricity generation has been included in the 
sectors eligible for OBAs precisely for this reason. 
Based on an average emissions intensity in Alberta of 0.79 kilograms of CO
2
e per MWh,13 
a $30-per-tonne carbon price would add just over $0.024 per kWh produced — enough 
to add roughly $170 to the average household’s electricity bill (and substantially more for 
commercial and industrial users). Given the politically sensitive nature of electricity prices, 
OBAs can serve to limit the extent to which consumer electricity prices rise. If structured 
properly, carbon pricing will still incentivize electricity producers to opt for less emissions-
intensive generation technologies, though in this case OBAs come at the cost of a lower 
incentive for consumers to limit electricity consumption.
The issues identified above create the scope for complementary policy to a carbon price. 
For example, attempting to address competitiveness concerns through a lower carbon price 
would negate the emissions-reduction incentive while failing to address the root cause of 
the concerns: low or no carbon pricing in competitor jurisdictions. Below, we flesh out in 
more detail appropriate policies for designing an OBA system.
PRINCIPLES FOR DESIGN
We offer four primary design principles for consideration in the design and implementation 
of an OBA system: independence and uniformity, transparency, output-product-based 
market and sector definition, and minimization of administrative costs. 
Independence and Uniformity
The allocations offered by a government to firms and their facilities should be independent 
of each facility’s emissions, and the same for otherwise identical activities. This is the most 
critical design element, by far. To illustrate this in practice, consider Alberta’s oil sands.
In Figure 5 we plot the oil sands in-situ facilities subject to Alberta’s SGER system. In 
blue, we illustrate the cost per barrel if each facility had to pay a $30-per-tonne tax on its 
emissions. The amount of GHGs emitted in the process of producing a barrel of oil varies 
12 
At present, both the Alberta government’s announced OBA strategy (Government of Alberta, n.d.) and the Canadian 
federal government’s announced carbon-pricing backstop strategy (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017c) have 
indicated that smaller firms (those below the high-emitter cut off for direct inclusion in the respective policies) will be 
allowed to opt in to the OBA system at their own discretion.
13 
Source: Table A11-10 in Canada’s National Inventory Report (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2017b). Data is 
available online at http://donnees.ec.gc.ca/data/substances/monitor/national-and-provincial-territorial-greenhouse-gas-
emission-tables/E-Tables-Electricity-Canada-Provinces-Territories/?lang=en.
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substantially across facilities. Pricing carbon at $30 per tonne will therefore increase costs 
at emissions-intensive facilities more than at less-intensive ones. At the high end, Nexen’s 
Long Lake facility would see cost increases of nearly $6 per barrel while Suncor’s MacKay 
River facility would see less than $1.
FIGURE 5 IN-SITU CARBON COSTS VERSUS UNIFORM OBA (OUTPUT SUBSIDY), 2015
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We illustrate in red the implied per barrel subsidy if 80 per cent of revenue raised from 
a carbon price is to be returned. This is also roughly consistent with the “top-quartile” 
performance recommendation of the Leach report. Under that recommendation, the 25 per 
cent of facilities with the best emissions-intensity performance would receive output subsidies 
in excess of their carbon costs while the remaining 75 per cent of facilities would not. 
Why are uniform output subsidies per unit important? Consider another way of thinking 
about the subsidy: in terms of free emissions permits allocated to firms. In Figure 6 — for 
the same set of Alberta oil sands facilities — we show the allocations roughly consistent 
with SGER (though, in practice, the allocations may differ) relative to a uniform system. 
Illustrated in blue, SGER allocates more free permits to emissions-intensive facilities like 
Nexen, and less to those with lower emissions intensity. Essentially, SGER allows Nexen to 
emit nearly 160 kilograms of GHGs per barrel for free but only allows Cenovus’ Christina 
Lake facility to emit less than 30 kilograms. Since such permits have value, this is in effect 
providing a larger subsidy to dirty facilities relative to cleaner ones. 
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FIGURE 6 GHG CREDIT ALLOCATION OPTIONS, PER BARREL PRODUCED, 2015
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By contrast, the red bars represent allocations that are independent of a facility’s actual 
emissions and consistent with the uniform output subsidy described earlier. Notice that 
relative to the SGER system, allocating credits in a way that is independent of a facility’s 
emissions tends to benefit low-intensity facilities and harm high-intensity ones. This will 
incentivize greater expansion of low-intensity facilities relative to high-intensity ones. That 
is, it incentivizes an efficient reallocation of production across facilities in a way that lowers 
the overall GHG footprint of the oil sands sector as a whole.
The principle of independence and uniformity not only implies all firms should receive the 
same subsidy per unit of output, but also demands allocations do not depend on whether 
a facility adopts an efficiency-enhancing innovation. Current SGER rules, for example, 
allow for a facility’s baseline level of emissions to be re-established for a variety of reasons, 
including major modifications to facilities, expansions, decommissionings, and so on. The 
rules further note that the government “will work with facilities to determine appropriate 
recognition of facility improvements during baseline restatements” (Government of 
Alberta, 2012). 
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If allocations fall following a reduction in a facility’s emissions, then the willingness 
of a firm to invest in emissions-reducing technologies will fall and this weakens the 
fundamental goal of emissions pricing. Put another way, tying allocations to a facility’s own 
emissions creates incentives akin to taxing efforts to lower emissions. A better approach 
is to ensure that facility-level allocations are not a function of the facility’s own emissions, 
present or historic. To the extent that they are historically determined, they should ideally 
evolve in an independent pre-set manner — perhaps tied to industrywide improvements, or 
some fixed tightening rate.
We note that the level of funding provided to output subsidies, and how these subsidies are 
allocated across industries, are important questions, deserving of additional work. In this 
paper, we attempt to provide general principles guiding the design of an OBA structure. 
In contrast, Bohringer et al. (2017) examine the optimal level of OBAs in a variety of 
scenarios, but say little about optimal design structure.
Transparency and Government Revenue
There is no free lunch, and output subsidies are no exception. The scope to which the 
government can compensate emissions-intensive and trade-exposed firms depends on 
the revenue available. While this is an obvious point, using government revenues on 
these output subsidies means this revenue is not available for other, equally worthy policy 
objectives. 
The government can and should report OBA valuations as tax-expenditure items. The 
magnitudes in question are substantial. Environment and Climate Change Canada data 
reports large emitters in Alberta emitted roughly 135 million tonnes of GHGs in 2014. If 
all were priced at $30 per tonne, this would generate over $4 billion in government revenue 
— which the government could put towards other objectives, from lowering other taxes to 
spending on various initiatives. Instead, the 2017/18 provincial budget reports only $800–
$900 million in compliance payments by large emitters. Implicitly, this recognizes that 
OBAs will come at a cost of over $3 billion. This may indeed satisfy a worthy public policy 
objective — as described earlier — but transparency will become increasingly important 
going forward.
It also underscores the importance of the rate at which allocations shrink over time — the 
so-called tightening rate. As allocations fall, the government reduces the implicit output 
subsidy and this frees up revenue for other purposes. In Alberta, with each two-per-cent 
reduction in the magnitude of the OBAs, carbon tax revenue increases by $60 million 
as that amount is no longer provided as a subsidy in the form of foregone taxes paid. 
In addition, as emissions are reduced due to the incentive provided by the carbon tax, 
carbon-tax revenues will decline, making output subsidies more difficult to support.14 Of 
course, whether or how quickly allocations tighten depends crucially on the competitive 
environment in which firms operate, and the stringency of environmental policies 
elsewhere. Transparent and full reporting will ensure the stability, effectiveness, efficiency, 
and fairness of the system can be maintained/improved in the future.
14 
It is worth noting that a long-term decline in carbon-tax revenues is a desired result of the policy. That is, the carbon price is 
not intended to be a revenue-generation tool for government but rather to incent a reduction in emissions.
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We stop short of recommending either a specific subsidy rate or a specific tightening rate 
as this will depend on the characteristics of industries in each jurisdiction. However, it is 
worth noting that care should be taken to ensure the chosen rate does not result in a net 
subsidy to industry. This overshoots the objective of the policy, which is to compensate for 
no more than the competitiveness impact of the carbon price, and also risks a violation of 
World Trade Organization rules. 
Product-Based Market and Sector Definitions
As indicated, the primary function of the OBA system is to maintain competitiveness in 
industries that would otherwise be adversely affected by the imposition of a carbon tax. In 
the example above, we have used a loose definition of the oil sands as the industry to which 
a specific OBA rate would be applied. However, the complete design of an OBA system 
will require specific definitions for sets of firms with a shared industry or market to which a 
single OBA rate should be applied.
Datasets for the national and provincial economies often include industry definitions based 
on existing classifications (for example, the North American Industry Classification System, 
or NAICS, is often used). However, the primary functions of these classification systems 
are data collection and organization. We assert that they are not always useful and should 
not be relied upon too heavily for the purpose of defining OBA industries. As a simple 
initial example, the NAICS classifies conventional oil and natural gas extraction as a single 
sector. Basing an OBA system on this classification would mean that all of the items in the 
following list would receive the same OBA rate:
• coal gasification and pyrolysis at the mine site
• crude oil, conventional extraction
• fractionating natural gas liquids
• liquefied petroleum gases (LPG) from natural gas production and mining
• natural butane, ethane, isobutane and propane production
• natural gas cleaning and preparation plants
• natural gas liquids recovering and mining
• oil and gas exploration
Note that different items on the above list compete in different markets. In addition, a single 
item here may compete in multiple markets. As such, basing an OBA system — which is 
intended to maintain competitiveness in individual industries — on the above classification 
system would be ineffective relative to an industrial or market definition tailored to the goal 
of the OBA system.15
Because a core goal of an effective OBA system is to maintain competitiveness, we 
advocate for an industry/market definition similar to the one employed by competition 
15 
Recent academic work has relied on six-digit NAICS categories to define sectors for OBA purposes (Gray and Metcalf, 
2017). While the six-digit NAICS classification has been viewed in this existing work as an appropriate classification 
scheme, Gray and Metcalf and related studies of OBA design have focused on the U.S. economy where oil and gas 
extraction in particular constitutes a far smaller proportion of overall economic activity compared to the Canadian case. 
Even at the six-digit level, conventional oil and gas are still grouped as a single NAICS sector, suggesting that in applying 
an OBA system to Canada, the NAICS classification system should not be too heavily relied upon.
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authorities such as Canada’s Competition Bureau. A core tenet of most competition policy 
is that it should exist and be enforced for the purpose of protecting competition, not for 
the purpose of protecting competitors. This distinction is important. Designing a policy to 
protect individual competitors (i.e., individual firms) can and will lead to situations where 
inefficient firms are supported and protected. The protection of inefficient firms limits 
economic growth and paradoxically harms competition. Any policy protecting inefficient 
firms limits the growth of efficient firms and removes the incentive for individual firms 
(and by extension the incentive for whole industries) to become more efficient. 
Under a typical competition policy application, a “product-based” industry or market-
definition system is used. Under a product-based system, if firms produce identical — or 
very similar — products, they are classified as being in the same industry or market. Such 
a definition completely divorces a firm’s costs and related efficiency from its association 
with a specific industry or market. All that matters in classifying a firm into a particular 
industry or market are the characteristics of the good or service being provided by the firm. 
Under this type of industry or market classification, any support (such as a specific OBA 
rate) given to a specific firm is afforded to all of that firm’s direct competitors as well. This 
maintains a level playing field for all competitors. In the context of our oil sands example 
from above, oil sands facilities producing non-upgraded bitumen should receive the same 
OBA rate regardless of the costs of production, and regardless of whether the facility is in 
situ or a mine, or of the specific quality of the producing reservoir.16
The definition of specific OBA rates based on product (rather than the characteristics of the 
firm producing it) is also easily extended to the case of multiproduct firms. Where a firm 
produces multiple products it is a simple matter to associate specific OBA rates with each 
product being produced, which would define the firm’s total received subsidy. However, that 
being said, the principle of product-based market and sector definitions should be directly 
superseded by the principle of minimizing administrative costs if the two principles come 
into conflict. Efficiency gains from better market and sector definitions should not come at 
the expense of a dramatic increase in administrative costs.
In addition to the Leach report’s stated concerns about competitiveness, the report also 
comments on the issue of carbon leakage: “Carbon leakage occurs when there is an increase 
in emissions in one jurisdiction as a result of an emissions reduction in a jurisdiction with 
a strict climate policy. Carbon leakage may occur if an emissions policy raises local costs 
thereby giving another jurisdiction with a more relaxed policy a trading advantage.”
With respect to the carbon leakage issue, an OBA system with OBA rates based on 
specific products is the best suited to address the issue of carbon leakage. By protecting the 
competitiveness of an industry, as defined by the set of firms producing a specific product, a 
product-based OBA system will significantly reduce or eliminate the trading advantage that 
might otherwise be afforded to firms producing the same product in other jurisdictions.
16 
A technical market definition based on these principles would ideally rely on some “critical” minimum elasticity of 
substitution between any two goods defined to be in the same market. Due to the administrative costs of identifying a wide 
enough set of elasticity estimates, a formalized technical set of market definitions is likely infeasible. However, the same 
basic logic can apply to the market-definition principle even in the absence of formal elasticity estimates.
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Minimizing Administrative Costs
The OBA system will have an administrative burden on the government and the firms 
participating in it. Keeping the number of special cases and different products included in 
the system low will reduce this administrative cost. If the cost of implementing a special 
case is greater than the expected competitiveness benefit, it should be avoided.
This design principle is aided by following the other principles outlined above. For example, 
if OBAs are the same amount per unit produced by any firm or facility producing the same 
output, then all the information that is needed to assign the OBA is a firm’s total output of 
the product. No information on its emissions intensity is, strictly speaking, necessary.
Another consideration in minimizing administrative costs is the cost of alternative 
policy measures to address the same competitiveness concerns. One policy option that 
immediately comes to mind is border carbon-tax adjustments, which levy a tariff on 
imports from a jurisdiction based on their carbon content (and potentially provides a credit 
to exports). An OBA system is less administratively complex, as the “optimal” system we 
are describing does not require firm- or facility-level data, as all firms/facilities receive the 
same allocation of output credits. In contrast, a system involving a border-tax adjustment 
requires information on the emissions content of each product.
A POTENTIAL COMPROMISE: TRANSITION PERIOD TO EFFICIENT OBAS
As noted earlier, the specifics of the OBAs that will be a part of the federal carbon-pricing 
system, and Alberta’s carbon-pricing system, have yet to be announced. As the OBAs 
will be a new policy, an important consideration is how “old” large emitters should be 
transitioned to the new system, given they made their investment decision in a different 
policy environment from today. In Alberta’s case, large emitters are subject to the SGER 
until the end of 2017, at which point they will be transitioned to the CCR.17 In provinces that 
may be subject to the federal government’s OBAs, large facilities may not have faced any 
prior carbon-pricing regulation.
In both scenarios, a useful way to transition is to start with a facility’s past emissions 
intensity to determine its allocation of the output subsidy and transition to a system where 
allocations are uniform according to facility-specific tightening rates. We once again turn to 
Alberta’s oil sands as an example of how such a system might be functionally implemented.
17 
It seems likely the government will push the adoption date of CCR to Jan. 1, 2019. The federal government’s backstop 
policy for large emitters is also set to begin on Jan. 1, 2019.
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FIGURE 7 GHG CREDIT-ALLOCATION OPTIONS, PER BARREL PRODUCED, 2015
 
10%
6%
2%
1%
1%
1%
0%
0%
-1%
-1%
-1%
-2%
-4%
-5%
-5%
-6%
-7%
-8%
-10%
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Suncor, MacKay River
Cenovus, Christina Lake
Cenovus, Foster Creek
Devon, Jackfish 2
Devon, Jackfish 1
MEG, Christina Lake
Statoil, Leismer
ConocoPhilips, Surmont
OSUM, Orion
Suncor, Firebag
Connacher, Great Divide Pod One
CNRL, Wolf Lake and Primrose N/S
Imperial Oil, Cold Lake
JCOSL, Hangingstone
CNRL, Burnt Lake and Primrose E
Connacher, Algar
Husky, Tucker Thermal
Shell, Peace River
Nexen Inc., Long Lake
kg of GHG Credits per Barrel
Distortionary System (Previous SGER) Uniform System (Ideal CCR)
10-Year Transition
Tightening Rates
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SGER compliance data for 2015
As demonstrated in Figure 7, one could gradually move GHG allocations per barrel from 
the distortionary SGER system to the uniform allocation system under an ideal CCR by 
choosing facility-specific tightening rates that are maintained through time until uniformity 
is achieved. High-emissions-intensity facilities are tightened at a relatively faster rate, while 
low-intensity facilities experience increases. Note that the figure above is for illustrative 
purposes only and is not meant to imply that all of the facilities should be treated similarly. 
If facilities produce sufficiently different products then there is a strong case for differential 
treatment as noted above. As long as tightening rates are independent of a facility’s own 
emissions, now or in the future, and the eventual allocations to which all facilities converge 
are uniform, then this phased-in approach represents a compromise between fairness (for 
historically high-emissions-intensity facilities) and efficiency (which demands uniformity 
and independence in allocations).
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are a few other considerations for policy-makers in addition to the principles we 
identified above.
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Pipelines
Pipelines do not necessarily fall into the category of “emissions intensive, trade exposed.” 
However, there are fairness considerations because the users of the pipelines are trade 
exposed. For that reason, it may be desirable to include pipelines in the OBA system.
If pipelines are included, then each pipeline should be treated as a separate market, as 
they each offer a different service. That is, using the product-based principle for industrial 
classification, each pipeline is in its own market/industry: transportation of oil from 
Edmonton to Burnaby is not the same product as transportation of oil from Edmonton to 
the U.S. Gulf Coast. For that reason, the allocation provided should be pipeline-specific.18 
The tightening rate should be independent of historical emissions to ensure the incentive to 
reduce emissions is present.
Upgrading and Petrochemical Processing
The government of Alberta has indicated its intention to introduce policies to incentivize 
increased upgrading and petrochemical processing in the province. In developing these 
policies and designing the OBA system, the government should carefully evaluate potential 
interactions. For example, if both sets of policies involve government subsidies, then there 
is the possibility of overly subsidizing these sectors.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, we have outlined key principles for building a fair, effective and efficient 
policy to address Canada’s competitiveness concerns regarding carbon pricing. Though 
there are many details we have glossed over, this paper provides important considerations 
for designing large-emitter OBAs. These principles are:
 1. Independence and Uniformity
   OBAs should be provided at the same per-unit level of output across all firms 
within a given market or sector. As a corollary, the allocations shouldn’t depend 
on changes in a specific facility’s own emissions over time. Providing OBAs 
inevitably increases emissions (relative to a scenario with carbon pricing only) 
as it prevents a contraction in the scale of a firm’s operations. However, if 
allocated uniformly across firms and independently of a facility’s own emissions 
then it need not undermine the carbon-pricing incentive to lower emissions 
intensity.
 2. Transparency of Subsidies
   OBAs cost money. Government budgets should account for the value of the 
implied subsidies to firm output as tax-expenditure items. Doing this ensures 
full and open debate about the appropriate role and size of subsidies provided to 
large industrial emitters.
18 
For Alberta, the initial OBA rate should be based on an allocation equivalent to what each pipeline receives under the 
Specified Gas Emitters Regulation.
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	 3.	Product-Based	Classifications
   All firms producing similar products should be treated similarly. To avoid 
treating different firms similarly that happen to be within the same NAICS code, 
governments should look to a product-based classification scheme. 
 4. Minimizing Administrative Costs
   An important reason why carbon taxes may dominate cap-and-trade systems, 
and why both tend to dominate non-pricing regulatory approaches to lowering 
emissions, is that they are administratively simple and cheap to implement. 
Treating large emitters differently will necessarily entail added costs to 
governments. Some ways of designing an OBA system, however, are more 
administratively burdensome than others. Governments should, all else equal, 
pursue simple systems that minimize administrative costs.
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